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Insiders, Outsiders and the Struggle for Consecration in Cultural Fields:  
A Core-Periphey Perspective 
 
ABSTRACT 
Building on recent research emphasizing how legitimacy depends on consensus among 
audiences about candidates’ characteristics and activities, we examine the relationship between 
cultural producers’ (candidates) position in the social structure and the consecration of their 
creative work by relevant audiences. We argue that the outcome of this process of evaluation in 
any cultural field, whether in art or science, is a function of (1) candidates’ embeddedness within 
the field, and (2) the type of audience, i.e., peers vs. critics, evaluating candidates’ work. 
Specifically, we hypothesize that peers are more likely to favor candidates who are highly 
embedded in the field while critics will not show such favoritism. We find support for these 
hypotheses in the context of the Hollywood motion picture industry. The theoretical implications 
of the results are discussed.  
 
Key Words: Consecration; Peers and Critics; Cultural Producers; Core/Periphery; Film Industry. 
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Bourdieu’s seminal work on cultural fields (1993) emphasizes the role of relevant audiences as 
agents of consecration with the authority to produce symbolic capital. The ability to impose 
judgments of symbolic legitimacy, or the power to consecrate, in cultural fields allows 
participants to reproduce their positions—thus influencing the choice of (and return to) different 
aesthetic strategies (DiMaggio 2011). Because these judgments produce prestige hierarchies and 
affect field evolution, cultural fields are in an incessant state of struggle between established and 
emerging actors who compete for symbolic distinction based on subjective rules of merit, and the 
vested interests and social objectives that they embody. While incumbents work to defend and 
reproduce their view and impose consensus, challengers try to “break the silence of the doxa and 
call into question the unproblematic, taken-for-granted world of the dominant groups” (Bourdieu 
1993, p. 83). The structural outcomes of this struggle have been variously conceptualized as 
dichotomies that classify cultural producers into incumbents and dissidents, insiders and 
outsiders, orthodox and heretics, core and peripheral players.   
Several studies (e.g., Anheier et al. 1995; Faulkner 1983; Faulkner and Anderson 1987; 
Giuffrè 1999) have found empirical support for an oppositional structure permeating cultural 
fields, in which a relatively small number of established players have the necessary material and 
political resources to enforce norms and standards for evaluating cultural productions that 
conform to their specific interests, while a much larger number of peripheral players try to 
advance alternative views and voice their relevance to the field. Thus, the propensity to produce 
work that departs from a field’s canons and expectations is not randomly distributed but tends to 
map onto the field’s social structure: core players are more likely to defend orthodoxy in cultural 
production because “their symbolic capital was founded on already-established types of cultural 
production, such as the performance of canonical works” (Kremp 2010, p. 1055). In contrast, 
peripheral players are more likely to produce work that departs from the field’s canons and 
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expectations. Because cultural fields operate to reproduce the power and privilege of incumbent 
groups, peripheral players have only limited chances of  proving their worth, especially if their 
products contrast sharply with prevailing expectations. What mechanisms can help peripheral 
players break into the prestige hierarchies of cultural fields? What role do social audiences play 
in shaping the struggle for legitimacy between core and peripheral players?  
We address these questions by proposing a framework based on Bourdieu’s intuition 
regarding the role of social audiences
1
 in shaping the allocation of symbolic capital between core 
and peripheral members of a cultural field. Our strategy is to focus on two types of audiences 
that reward cultural producers – peers and critics. These audiences correspond to two distinct 
selection systems, each emphasizing different criteria to assign cultural legitimacy (Allen and 
Lincoln 2004; Kersten and Bielby 2012).  
In the US feature-film industry, our empirical setting, cultural producers have become 
increasingly concerned with professional and critical recognition following the legitimation of 
film as an art form in the late 1950s and 1960s (Baumann 2001, 2007). After characterizing the 
particular discourse of value that regulates the practice of consecration within each of these 
audiences, we investigate how peers and critics differ in the extent to which their symbolic 
capital allocation – in the form of prizes and awards – is influenced by the socio-topographic 
location of those whom they evaluate. Our findings reveal that cultural producers who are core 
members of a field enjoy disproportionately higher esteem from peer audiences. Critics, on the 
other hand, do not favor core producers in their consecration decisions and may even give some 
                                                 
1
 We employ the term ‘audience’ rather than other (related) concepts such as gatekeepers, social groups or 
stakeholders because it offers a more accurate and sociologically richer foundation to our arguments. The notion of 
social audience subsumes the following key ideas – not always as clearly present in related concepts: resource 
asymmetry; congruence with minimal criteria; and evaluation of social objects as a social process. Indeed, audiences 
control the material or symbolic resources on which cultural producers depend for success and survival (Zuckerman 
1999); cultural producers (candidates) seeking to access such resources are expected to present audience members 
with offers that meet their criteria; and the selective allocation of worth follows a process of evaluation based on a 
set of criteria against which the social object is evaluated (Lamont 2012). 
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preference to peripheral producers. These findings emphasize the importance of studying how 
different audience-level selection mechanisms influence the structure of symbolic capital 
allocation  and ultimately affect field-level social structure and change.  
The Hollywood feature-film industry provides an ideal context for testing the 
implications of our theoretical framework. Every year, several organizations of elite peers and 
critics bestow awards on those judged to have made exemplary cinematic contributions. These 
awards are important vehicles through which cultural producers may internalize collective social 
norms about what is sacred and what is profane, and who is an insider and who is an outsider 
(Rossman, Esparza and Bonacich 2010; Watson and Anand 2006). In this way, award 
ceremonies are crucial mechanisms for social stratification as they “construct prestige hierarchies 
that both enable and constrain actors’ abilities to form relationships with others in a field” 
(Anand and Watson 2004, p. 776). We exploit these industry features to study the relationship 
between social structure, audiences, and consecration in cultural fields.  
 
Cultural Fields and the Struggle for Legitimacy 
The impact of social structure on the propensity to engage in innovative rather than conforming 
behavior has deep sociological roots. As Simmel (1971) noted, marginal actors “with the least 
opportunity for full participation in the most valued activities of their own society […] may be 
stimulated to make new responses which depart from the habitually required” (Coser 1962, p. 
179). Several studies by sociologists of science and culture have emphasized that peripheral 
actors are in a unique position to champion dissenting ideas that challenge the natural order (e.g., 
Mulkay 1972; Edge 1977; Tuchman 1989; Mezias and Mezias 2000; Kirschbaum and 
Vasconcelos 2007; Cattani and Ferriani 2008). Being less tied to norms that regulate those who 
are in the core of the field, peripheral actors possess what Zuckerman and Merton (1973, pp. 
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518-519) call “focused naïveté” – i.e., “a useful ignorance of prevailing assumptions and theories 
that allows them to attack problems generally regarded as impossible or uninteresting by 
specialists.” For this reason, they may be more open to lines of inquiry that run counter to 
received wisdom. The challenge for peripheral players is that the same social position that 
enables them to depart from prevailing norms may also restrict their access to resources and 
social contacts that would facilitate the completion and legitimation of their work.  
Bourdieu (1993, pp. 57-58) identified two mechanisms that enable peripheral players to 
establish their cultural authority. The first is the occurrence of exogenous changes, such as 
revolutions or other political crises, that open up space for alternative views. The second rests on 
the availability of a homologous reception space, namely an audience predisposed by its beliefs 
and tastes to consider the kinds of offers being proposed. Cultural sociologists and institutional 
theorists have extensively examined the role of exogenous shocks in subverting a field’s 
dominant logic (e.g., Collins 1987; Zucker 1988). However, the possibility of audience-level 
variations offering countervailing mechanisms to the social stratification process has been 
understudied. 
The understanding of legitimacy as a relationship with an audience rather than a 
possession of the actor is central to the theory of cultural fields. We take seriously Bourdieu’s 
assertion that “all the homologies which guarantee a receptive audience and sympathetic critics 
for producers who have found their place in the structure work in the opposite way for those who 
have strayed from their natural site” (1993, pp. 95-96). The existence of a homologous audience 
is a critical precondition for peripheral cultural producers to climb the reputational ladder. 
Contributions that conflict with the dominant view “cannot be understood sociologically unless 
one takes account of the homology between the dominated position of the producers … and the 
position in social space of those agents … who can divert their accumulated cultural capital so as 
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to offer to the dominated the means of objectively constituting their view of the world” 
(Bourdieu 1985, pp. 737-738).   
Peripheral field members can benefit greatly from the presence of a homologous 
audience, one whose views, beliefs and tastes are attuned to their own. Anand and Watson 
(2004) provided a powerful illustration in their study of the Grammy awards given by the 
National Academy of Recording Arts and Sciences. The Academy initially opposed the 
recognition of progressive genre musicians such as rock and roll and rap artists. But 
intergenerational changes in Academy demographics, particularly the entry of new members 
whose tastes and values were more attuned to those of progressive musicians, proved crucial in 
gaining legitimacy for peripheral actors. We explore and extend these ideas by examining a case 
in which the observed variation is not within – as in Anand’s and Watson’s account – but across 
different audiences. Specifically, we examine two audiences—peers and critics—that have quite 
different degrees of homology with respect to the producers that they evaluate.  
 
THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF CONSECRATION IN HOLLYWOOD 
Choice of Hollywood as Field  
We believe that the Hollywood feature-film industry is an ideal setting for our analysis. This 
industry embodies key aspects of our theoretical framework: cultural producers are entangled in 
a “competitive struggle for advantage and advancement” (Faulkner 1983, p. 69). Like many 
cultural fields, Hollywood is dominated by an elite, with only a small fraction of cultural 
producers having successfully climbed the reputational ladder (Faulkner and Anderson 1987).  
There are also severe disparities in control over resources, together with a “very large pool of 
peripheral participants who vie to establish a foothold in the industry” (Zuckerman et al. 2003, p. 
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1036). The mechanisms by which marginal players acquire symbolic capital are therefore of 
particular interest.   
Field players (e.g., producers, distributors, etc.) tend to invest in past successes and avoid 
recruiting professionals that do not have established reputations or work on projects that do not 
fit recognized categories (Zuckerman and Kim 2003). This pattern of investment yields a 
continually reproduced system of inequality whereby a small number of individuals and 
organizations are very productive, and often very conspicuous in terms of their connections and 
rewards, while a much larger group remains on the margins of the network (Faulkner 1983; 
Giuffrè 1999). Professionals advance their careers by accruing credits and connections that allow 
them to move from the margins of the network to the center. Projects (here movies) are the 
material means for making social announcements about one’s ability and identity.  
In network analytic terms, the social structure of the feature-film industry is dominated by 
a core-periphery split in which “the inner core of actors tends to be a small world of tightly knit 
individuals, whereas the periphery is more open” (Peterson and Anand 2004, p. 322), allowing 
individuals with skills and resources to gain an entry point into the system. This partition reflects 
a relentless pressure to become visible and “push one’s image, voice and credentials deeper into 
the industry’s culture” (Faulkner 1983, p. 22). Yet, as Faulkner’s (1983) work on Hollywood 
composers clearly shows, the odds of a movie professional moving from the periphery to the 
core are extremely low. It is worth noting that admission into the core also comes with liabilities 
in the form of tighter restrictions on productions that challenge recognized standards and 
categories. At times such restrictions are so strong that some cultural producers may perceive 
them as onerous, perhaps even contrary to their self-understanding as artists (Anheier et al. 
1995). 
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A second motivation for studying the feature-film industry is the opportunity to examine 
how different audiences’ evaluation criteria shape a professional’s chances of being culturally 
consecrated. Starting in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the transition from the studio system to 
director-centered production led to the legitimation of film as an art form in the United States. 
This was followed by the proliferation of film festivals and ceremonies intended to celebrate 
cinematic achievement through special prizes and awards (Bauman 2001). Such honors are 
bestowed both by those directly involved in the film industry (i.e., peer professionals) and by 
movie critics. The results of these evaluations are made public every year by conferring prizes 
that celebrate exemplary achievements, thereby establishing a level of recognition in the field 
unattainable through other means. These accolades and rituals constitute “the symbolic capital 
that may serve as an alternative to economic capital” (Baumann 2001, p. 406) and signal that 
film production has achieved a certain autonomy as a field.  
 
Peers, Critics and the Allocation of Symbolic Rewards 
Cultural legitimation involves the use of aesthetic judgments to assign value to cultural 
producers and their products. Bourdieu (1993, pp. 50-51) identified three different types of 
cultural legitimacy: public acclaim (popular legitimacy), professional recognition from peers 
(specific legitimacy), and critical evaluation (bourgeois legitimacy).
2
 Different audiences 
typically employ different criteria. Here we focus on the selective judgments that express two 
distinct aesthetic logics embedded in the world of professional criticism and in the world of film 
practice.
3
 As Allen and Lincoln noted: “The existence of competing discourses of value may 
                                                 
2
 We would like to thank an anonymous review for bringing to our attention this important point. 
3
 We do not focus on popular acclaim for two reasons. First, the selection criteria governing the taste of ordinary 
consumers are subject to extreme and erratic fluctuations due to mechanisms of social influence (Salganick et al. 
2006). A well-known implication of such mechanisms is the pervasive “nobody knows” effect, i.e., the impossibility 
of predicting which cultural product or producer will receive popular acclaim (De Vany and Walls 1996). Second, 
while in our empirical context peers and critics grant individual-level legitimacy by rewarding particular 
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explain why films that receive professional recognition from other cultural producers are not 
always the same films as those that receive critical recognition from critics” (2004, p. 877). 
Similarly, Kersten and Bielby (2012) suggest that critics’ evaluations vary systematically on 
several aesthetic dimensions across films ultimately consecrated by peers or critics.
4
  
In the US feature-film industry, peers and critics are organized into distinct awarding 
organizations that reveal their preferences in annual ceremonies that play a critical role in 
constructing prestige hierarchies (O’Neil 2003; Gemser, Leenders and Wijnberg 2008). Like 
tournament rituals (Anand and Watson 2004), these ceremonies not only offer established 
professionals an opportunity to reinforce their authority but are also “the arena within which non-
elites can express alternative and non-official attitudes and values” (Lukes 1975, p. 299). Using 
information on professional societies’ membership, we classified Hollywood’s main awarding 
organizations into peer- and critic-based. Peer-based awarding organizations include the 
Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences and the various professional guilds (e.g., 
Directors Guild of America, Screen Actors Guild, etc.). Critic-based awarding organizations 
include the New York Film Critics Circle, the National Society of Film Critics, the Los Angeles 
Film Critics, and the Boston Society of Film Critics (Table 1). These organizations have been in 
existence for several years, are widely regarded as reliable and competent, and have granted 
annual accolades in most major categories of filmmaking expertise (Levy 2003; Simonton 2004).  
<< Insert Table 1 Here >> 
Peer Recognition  
                                                                                                                                                             
professionals for their exemplary achievements across a variety of cinematic specialisms, popular recognition is a 
form of legitimacy that usually operates at the team/project level: box office rentals capture the commercial acclaim 
of the movie and there are no corresponding indicators at the level of the individual professionals within the team. 
4
 Kerstend and Bielby (2012) find that, while such aesthetic elements are constitutive components of critics’ 
discourses of value and are therefore present in all reviews, their use depends on the type of recognition (peer, 
popular or critical) a particular movie receives. 
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Peer audiences are members of the same community as the producers they evaluate, though 
taking on different roles (Debackere et al. 1994; Wijnberg 1995). This observation holds 
important implications for understanding how they evaluate cultural producers. First, peer 
evaluators are typically elite representatives of the field’s dominant canons. As such, they have 
the authority to determine the legitimate definition of a given type of work and, by extension, the 
authority to define those works which guarantee the configurations of the field’s canon 
(Bourdieu 1993). Accordingly, they tend to define excellence as “what is most like me” (Lamont 
2009) and to provide a disproportionate amount of material and symbolic resources to core 
members of the field who are more strongly associated with its dominant canons.  
Second, evaluators and producers who are located in the core of the field’s social 
structure are more likely to share similar cognitive and social networks, resulting in a potential 
bias toward work emanating from the core. Indeed, producers will be able to impress prominent 
peers if they share “with those whose judgment matters most a common repertoire of beliefs, 
assumptions, background knowledge…” (Gross 2000, p. 856). This has been documented in 
academic evaluation systems where evaluators are usually established and highly embedded 
scholars who “are frequently asked to adjudicate the work of individuals with whom they have 
only a few degrees of separation…” and “often favor their own type of research while being 
firmly committed to rewarding the strongest proposal” (Lamont 2009, p. 8). Third, elite peers are 
more prone to resist work that deviates from established normative expectations because they 
have a vested interest in guaranteeing “the continued reproduction of the legitimacy of those who 
produce or defend the canon” (Bourdieu 1993, p. 20). As Peterson (1979) noted, when the 
evaluation criteria “are tightly held by an academy of peers, there is an orientation to traditional 
canon of arts (or religion or science)” (p. 157). 
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These characteristics of peer audiences are well exemplified by the Academy of Motion 
Picture Arts and Sciences, both in the process by which it accepts new members and in the 
decisions it makes about nominations and awards. These decisions tend to reflect the aesthetic 
preferences of the elite group in each branch—namely those who are more attuned or 
homologous to the core players in Hollywood. Since its founding in 1927, the Academy has been 
an association of Hollywood’s creative elite. New members are invited to join “when their 
services to the motion picture industry have been prominent enough to make the Academy 
members feel they would like to have them as brother members” (Levy 2003, p.  46). Here, for 
example, are the official requirements for Directors Branch membership: 
“Membership shall be by invitation of the Board of Governors.  Invitations to active membership 
shall be limited to those persons employed by motion picture producing companies, or credited 
with screen achievements, or who have otherwise achieved distinction in their respective fields of 
endeavor within the industry and who, in the opinion of the Board, are qualified for membership” 
(http://www.oscars.org/academy/members/requirements/producers.html).  
 
 
The easiest way to become a member, however, is to get an award nomination—all Oscar 
nominees are invited to become members. Beyond that, each branch has its own criteria. In most 
branches, it is necessary to have several film credits, several years of experience, and 
sponsorship by two established members. Branch membership determines who has the right to 
vote regarding awards and nominations. Specifically, members vote on nominees in their 
respective categories (e.g., directors for directors, actors for actors, writers for writers). However, 
all voting members are eligible to select the Best Picture nominees. Except for the Actors 
Branch, the relatively smaller size of the other branches means that relatively few voters 
determine a nominee. For instance, in the Directors Branch, which in 2002 consisted of 364 
members (the number has not changed much over the years), a group of 20 or 30 members could 
nominate a director. Indeed, the Directors Branch is “not only small but cliquish as well” (Levy 
2003, p.  49).  
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Life membership and the relatively high average age of voting members may also impact 
the Academy’s decisions. The age difference between older members and those actively 
involved in filmmaking inevitably “make the Academy vote more conservative, lagging behind 
the industry’s aesthetic and technical innovations” (Levy 2003, p. 48). Indeed, the Academy vote 
is often criticized for displaying a conservative bias. The Best Picture winners, for example, are 
often described as “soft, noble, middlebrow movies that reflect the dominant culture, steering 
clear of provocative issues or innovative experimental styles” (Levy 2003, p. 48). 
The professional guilds are much larger than the Academy branches. For instance, in 
2002 the Academy’s Directors Branch consisted of 364 members, while the Directors Guild of 
America (DGA) had 12,400 members who, in addition to filmmakers, included TV directors, 
associate directors, stage managers, and unit production managers. Their larger membership base 
might suggest that guild decisions are less cliquish than the Academy’s. Yet the guilds’ award 
decisions do not support this suspicion. For example, according to O’Neil (2003, p. 797), the 
DGA award is considered “Hollywood’s most influential prize after the Oscar—for two reasons: 
directors are the reigning kings and queens of pix, so it matters a lot what their peers think, and 
second, Oscar voters defer most often to the DGA’s choices before inking their ballots”. From 
1947 to 2004 (which includes our study period) the Oscars have embraced 51 of the DGA’s 
winners in the Best Director category, an agreement rate of 89 percent.  
Decisions by the Screen Actors Guild (SAG) are also quite similar to those of the 
Academy. Since 1995 (when the SAG awards were first introduced) until 2004, 27 of the 44 
actors/actresses nominated by the SAG were also nominated by the Academy. Similar patterns 
hold for the other professional guilds. Thus, despite having thousands of additional members, 
guilds and Academy voters “are obviously like-minded” (O’Neil 2003, p. 794). 
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Critic Recognition  
Several considerations suggest that critics’ evaluations of cultural producers do not mirror those 
of peers. Because of their specialized training and high levels of cultural capital, critics cultivate 
aesthetic dispositions that raise their legitimacy as arbiters of taste and agents of consecration 
(Janssen 1997; Van Rees 1987). They also have significantly more incentive than peers to 
discover new talents with the potential to rise to fame (Bourdieu 1984). Indeed, a critic is 
motivated to be “the first to come up with an assessment that other people […] might somehow 
use as a peg for their own … response” (Van Rees 1987, p. 286). In fact, it may be dangerous for 
critics not to embrace a new style, as they risk losing reputation if that style becomes popular. In 
the visual arts, for instance, critics played a crucial role in fostering the rise of the “radical” 
painters who became known as the Impressionists. Systematically rejected by the Salon de Paris 
(the bastion of elite peers within the Académie des Beaux-Arts) which favored established 
artists, the impressionists found an homologous reception space in the world of critics and 
painting experts, who sometimes openly proclaimed their disdain for the judgments of the 
Académie. These critics did not have a vested interest in perpetuating the status quo because they 
“derived their legitimacy and importance from being among the first to recognize the value of 
new entrants into the visual arts industry” (Wijnberg and Gemser 2000, p. 324). 
A similar contrast between peers and critics seems to characterize the film industry. For 
the award of Best Director, the National Society of Films Critics agreed with the Oscars in only 
three instances during our study period, and only once with the DGA. The New York Film 
Critics agreed three times with the Oscars and two times with the DGA. The Los Angeles Film 
Critics agreed with the Oscars in five cases; the Boston Society of Film Critics two times with 
both Oscars and DGA. 
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Critics have what Simmel (1971) called the objectivity of the stranger—he who is not 
bound by stable social ties to other group members. Although both critics and cultural producers 
are members of the same field, they are not embedded in the same professional community. In 
principle, this should promote an unprejudiced perception, understanding, and assessment of 
candidates’ work, allowing them to make evaluations with more objectivity. Lacking an 
incentive to prefer one particular style over another, they may be more willing to support and 
consecrate offers that depart from the field’s dominant norms and standards—offers that 
typically (though not exclusively) emanate from the margins of the field (Collins 1987).  
Consider the impact of critics on the career of iconic filmmaker Quentin Tarantino. As a 
former employee of a video rental store in Los Angeles and with no formal filmmaking 
education, Tarantino had practically no markers of credibility and was truly peripheral when he 
directed his 1992 debut feature Reservoir Dogs. First screened at the Sundance Film Festival, 
Reservoir Dogs became the festival’s most talked-about movie, and Miramax decided to 
distribute it. Over the course of that year, Tarantino “turned up at festival after festival, receiving 
lavish praise and awards from intellectual critics for making the hottest indie of the year” (Levy 
1999, p. 15). In just a few years, Tarantino rose from obscurity to fame, and the fact that “the 
film didn’t do well didn’t matter. It created enough of a stir to give Tarantino the clout to make 
his next film, Pulp Fiction, with a larger budget ($8 million) and a high-caliber cast” (Levy 1999, 
p. 17). Notably, Reservoir Dogs received no recognition from the Academy, the guilds nor from 
any other purely peer-based audience. It might be tempting to regard Tarantino’s case as unique; 
in fact, it is highly instructive of how peripheral players can succeed by eliciting support from 
one homologous audience within a cultural field. 
The previous arguments suggest not only that symbolic rewards for cultural producers are 
socially structured, but also that the saliency of this structure may vary with the type of audience 
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bestowing those awards. One would expect peers to be more likely to consecrate core cultural 
producers as opposed to peripheral producers. We do not expect the same relationship for critics, 
however. They may have an incentive to consecrate the work of peripheral producers or at least 
to not discriminate between core and peripheral producers. By providing peripheral producers 
with space that is more receptive to their offers, critics may alter the stratification resulting from 
peers’ choices. Thus, we make two major predictions regarding the award decisions by these 
audiences: 
 
1. As organizations of peers bestow accolades, they are likely to favor members in the core 
of a cultural field over those in the periphery, holding other factors constant.  
 
2. As organizations of critics bestow accolades, they are not likely to favor members in the 
core of a cultural field over those in the periphery, and may actually favor those in the 
periphery.  
 
 
ANALYTIC STRATEGY 
Data Set 
Our data consist of the population of crew and cast members (hereafter “professionals”) who 
worked on at least one of the 2,297 movies distributed in the US by the eight major studios – the 
seven historical majors plus Dreamworks (founded in 1994) – and their various subsidiaries over 
the period 1992-2004. Because we are interested in films made and distributed by Hollywood, 
we did not include documentaries, foreign-made films, short films, and compilations. While 
focusing on the major studios might suggest a neglect of artistically oriented movies in favor of 
commercial ones, these companies have numerous divisions (often carried over from previous 
acquisitions) that specialize in different types of films (see Table 2).  
<< Insert Table 2 Here >> 
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Some of these specialize in small-budget niche films (often including such adjectives such as 
“repertory,” “independent” or “classic” in their names) and have been widely acknowledged as 
focusing on more artistically oriented movies and less visible talents. Thus, although we do not 
have data on the entire population of films, we believe the risk of underrepresenting the 
periphery of the Hollywood field is low. We gathered information on the composition of the 
production team of each movie and on the consecration of its members’ work by recording 
awards and/or nominations (hereafter “accolades”) received. We focused on the following 
professionals: director, writer, leading and supporting actor/actress, editor, cinematographer, and 
production designer. Using the Internet Movie Database (IMDB) we identified over 12,000 
professionals. We also crosschecked this information with the Alan Goble Film Index (Goble 
2003) to ensure data quality. Although we included producers in the analysis of the Hollywood 
social network, we excluded them from the analysis of accolades because there is no specific 
award that is assigned to producers. The award for best movie goes to the movie, a collaborative 
venture, even though the award is handed to the producer. 
 
Dependent Variable 
We used a discrete-choice approach to model the audience-candidate evaluation process, in 
which peer- and critic-based organizations select candidates whose work is consecrated with an 
award or a nomination, from among the large set of candidates eligible in a given year. This 
approach seems particularly appropriate given that consecration, by its very nature, imposes 
discrete (rather than continuous) distinctions between candidates who deserve recognition and 
those who do not (Allen and Lincoln 2004). In our context, a decision consists of a choice by a 
particular organization, in a particular year, to award an accolade (award or nomination) to a 
particular professional for performance in a particular role. Each decision has a choice set that 
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includes all the professionals who were potentially eligible for the accolade. For each member of 
the choice set, the dependent variable is coded 1 if a person received an award or nomination, 
otherwise 0. Separate discrete-choice models were estimated for peer organizations and critic 
organizations. 
 
Independent Variables 
To distinguish between core and peripheral producers, we adopted a network analytic approach 
in line with Faulkner (1983), Faulkner and Anderson (1987) and Anheier et al. (1995). We first 
identified the social network of interactions between Hollywood professionals from the bipartite 
affiliation structure between professionals and movies. This means that professionals working on 
the same movie are presumed to have a tie to one another (see Appendix for details).  
In an idealized core-periphery structure, the core is a group of nodes that are connected to 
all other nodes of both the core and the periphery. The periphery is a group of nodes that are not 
connected to each other but only to the nodes in the core. Although no real social network 
conforms to this ideal, an algorithm is used to maximize the density within the core and to 
minimize the density within the periphery. Borgatti and Everett (1999) proposed the following 
method for partitioning a set of nodes into a core and a periphery. Let ij be a (0, 1) variable 
indicating the presence of a tie between node i and node j. Define ij to have a value of 1 if both i 
and j are in the core, 0 if both i and j are in the periphery, and “missing” otherwise. Then choose 
a partition to maximize the Pearson correlation between  and , where the correlation is 
computed over all non-missing pairs. This can be accomplished with a genetic algorithm. 
Using the UCINET VI package (Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman 2002), we constructed 
the binary variable Periphery which takes the value 1 when individuals are in the periphery of 
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the Hollywood network and 0 for those in the core.
5
 This variable was based on network ties in a 
3-year moving window, but the results did not vary much using different time windows. 
The set of professionals in the core varies from year to year. Over the study period, 
approximately 346 different professionals (about 3% of the total) were in the core in at least one 
year. Professionals may stay in the core or the periphery for the entire period, or move from the 
periphery to the core (e.g., Billy Bob Thornton after All the Pretty Horses in 2000) and vice 
versa (e.g., Mira Sorvino after Mimic in 1997). The small size of the core reflects the unequal 
distribution of ties in the social structure of the movie industry. As Faulkner and Anderson 
(1987) observed: “The film community like most culture industry systems and like most high-
performance systems is dominated by an active elite and manifests inequality in productivity, 
[and] cumulative resources in the form of ties.”  
 
Control Variables 
To rule out alternative explanations for our hypothesized relationships, we included several 
control variables in our models. 
Role. As noted above, the analysis focuses on a restricted group of professional roles. 
Controlling for role is essential because the choice sets are specific to particular roles.  
Moreover, different organizations bestow awards for different roles, and the number of these has 
changed over time in some cases. While the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences tends 
to assign awards to all categories, the Los Angeles Film Critics Association assigns no awards 
for movie editing, and the various guilds only give awards to their members. Individuals 
                                                 
5
 The output in UCINET also includes an overall measure of “fitness” that indicates how well the observed data 
approximates an ideal core/periphery structure. Although there is no standard statistical test to assess the fitness 
significance, a high fitness measure implies a good agreement with the model, while a lower fitness measure 
suggests that the model should be rejected. Running the discrete model yielded an average correlation criterion of 
0.6, suggesting a satisfactory agreement with the model. 
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performing roles with more award categories have more chances of receiving accolades. We 
adjusted for these possibilities by including a fixed effect for the role each professional 
performed in a given movie. This was accomplished either by stratifying on role in conditional 
logistic regression or by including role as a set of dummy variables.  
Degree of Control. It is quite possible that individuals performing multiple roles also 
enjoy more freedom in the pursuit of their goals and are in a better position to express their skills 
and talents. While in most cases there was only one specialist per role, a professional sometimes 
performed multiple roles in a single movie (e.g., Clint Eastwood was director, actor and producer 
for Unforgiven in 1992) or the same role was collectively performed by multiple individuals 
(e.g., Joel and Ethan Cohen co-directed Fargo in 1996). We therefore created the variable 
Degree of Control to capture the extent to which professionals enjoy enough latitude to express 
their creativity by measuring the average number of different roles each professional performed 
in the same movie in a given year. This variable is similar to what Baker and Faulkner (1991) 
call “role as resource.” 
Commercial Success. Participation in commercially successful movies both reveals and 
shapes the perception of a professional’s place in the industry hierarchy. Indeed, Hollywood 
professionals’ bankability translates into stardom. Accordingly, we measured professionals’ 
commercial success by how well their previous movies fared at the box office. Specifically, we 
counted the number of “top 10” box office movies in which each professional worked during the 
three years prior to the focal year (results did not change much with different time windows). We 
also ran the analyses using the “top 20” and “top 30” box office movies, but results were not 
substantially affected.   
Artistic Reputation. For most observers, a high number of accolades in an individual’s 
career would seem to indicate exceptional talent and reputation. Previous research suggests that 
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the most successful movie professionals enjoy preferential access to resources and information 
(Faulkner and Anderson 1987) and are offered more jobs (Zuckerman et al. 2003), further 
increasing their chances of receiving an accolade. Accolade recipients also enjoy greater media 
attention than their lower-status counterparts. Accordingly, we created the variable Artistic 
Reputation, i.e., the number of accolades each professional gained during the three years prior to 
the focal year (again, the results did not change much with a different time window). 
Team Reputation. Movies are made through the complementary inputs of many 
professionals, each of whose efforts facilitates the work of other team members. In practice, this 
suggests that professionals should perform better when surrounded by talented collaborators 
(Rossman et al. 2010). Besides skills, status may also spill over from accomplished team 
members (Benjamin and Podolny 1999). Thus, a professional can receive greater recognition by 
collaborating with highly reputed colleagues. We measured the reputation of the team as the 
average number of accolades team members other than the focal individual received in the three 
years prior to the focal year. If a professional made more than one movie in a given year, we 
used the average number of prior accolades for all the team members s/he worked with in that 
year. 
Movie Sequel. Movie makers may strive for artistic originality or they may focus on 
more formulaic content. Although sequels are sometimes critically praised (e.g., the sequels to 
the Godfather and the Lord of the Rings), they tend to capitalize on a successful formula—which 
might reduce the likelihood of a professional receiving an accolade. Following previous studies 
(e.g., Ravid 1999), we created a dummy variable Sequel that has the value 1 if a movie is a 
sequel and 0 otherwise. 
Movie Rating. Another potential factor affecting the receipt of accolades is the rating 
assigned by the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA). Ratings signal the degree of 
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sexually graphic sequences, violence and strong language in a movie. Prior research suggests 
that features produced for mature audiences perform less well at the box office (Ravid 1999). 
Movies that are rated G, PG and PG-13 have greater audience potential, and indeed movie 
theaters’ landlords sometimes contractually prohibit them from showing NC-17 films. As a result 
studios quite often exert some pressure on directors (and producers alike) to ensure that films 
receive a rating aligned with their market aspirations. This practice can obviously constrain 
creativity (e.g., in the treatment of controversial material or the choice of scenes to edit out of a 
final print). We accounted for this by including a categorical variable with five categories: G, 
PG, PG-13, R, and no available rating. 
Movie Genre. The likelihood of an accolade being bestowed could also depend on movie 
genre, on the premise that a movie’s artistic content might vary across different genres (e.g., 
action, drama, comedy, thriller, animation). For instance, the thriller genre was seen as 
disreputable until the 1960s when American critics began to take Alfred Hitchcock seriously as 
an artist (Kapsis 1992). Similarly, a professional working on an action movie is less likely to 
gain accolades because action movies typically reflect more formulaic conventions. We created a 
categorical variable (with 18 categories) to control for each movie’s genre using data from the 
American Film Institute (AFI). 
Number of Movies. The chance of receiving an award or nomination is also likely to 
depend on the actual number of movies each professional makes in a given year. Since most 
professionals tend to work on a single movie per year, we created a dummy variable that is equal 
to 1 when a professional was involved in at least two movies during the focal year and 0 
otherwise. 
Awarding Organizations. We grouped the awarding organizations selected for this 
analysis into two distinct audiences, peers and critics, on the premise that each audience type 
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tends to apply similar norms and standards when they evaluate and reward individuals’ creative 
work. To account for the impact of stable, unobserved differences between organizations within 
the same audience type, we either stratified by awarding organization or included a set of dummy 
variables in the models.   
Year. Since we had no a priori expectations about possible trends over the study period, 
we controlled for unobserved factors (e.g., macro-economic trends, changes in taste or fashion, 
and other factors that might affect the movie industry) by stratifying by year or by treating year 
as a categorical variable.  
 
MODEL 
For a given role in a given year, we modeled the impact of a professional’s characteristics on the 
probability that an organization bestowed an accolade on that professional rather than any other 
who was eligible in that year. This can be framed as a series of discrete choices with a 
professional selected in each category (role) each year from a set of possible candidates. Let yij 
be equal to 1 if organization i (with i = 1, ... , n) chooses professional j (with j= 1,... , Ji), 
otherwise 0; and let xij be a vector of explanatory variables describing professional j for 
organization i. The number of possible choices is Ji to indicate that different organizations may 
have different sets of candidates to choose from. The conditional logit model introduced by 
McFadden (1973) has the following general form:  
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where  is a vector of coefficients. This equation implies that the odds that organization i will 
choose professional j over professional k is given by exp{β(xij – xik)}. That is, it is a function of 
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the difference in the vectors of explanatory variables describing the two professionals.
6
 In the 
analysis we split the sample into two subsamples, one of peers’ and the other of critics’ 
organizations (Table 2). We then stratified by awarding organization, professional’s role and year. 
We estimated the conditional logit model by maximum likelihood using PROC LOGISTIC in 
SAS (release 9.3). 
 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
We began by estimating separate discrete choice models for peers and critics in which the only 
predictor variable was Periphery, a dummy variable for whether or not a professional was in the 
core of the Hollywood network. As previously noted, these models simultaneously stratified by 
year, role, and awarding organization, so that each stratum corresponded to a choice set for an 
awarding organization in a particular year. Among peer organizations, the coefficient for 
Periphery was -1.233 (p<.0001), corresponding to an odds ratio of .29. In other words, a 
professional in the periphery had a 71 percent lower odds of being chosen for an accolade than a 
professional in the core. For critic organizations the Periphery coefficient was -.508 (p=.03) with 
an odds ratio of .60. These results suggest that both peers and critics had a preference for 
members of the core, although the effect size and level of significance is much stronger for peers.  
 Next we introduce our control variables into the model, with results shown in Table 3. 
Model 1 displays the results for peer organizations. Although we do not report coefficient 
estimates for Movie Genre and Movie Rating, the two sets of dummy variables both have a 
statistically significant overall impact. The coefficient for Movie Sequel is significant and in the 
                                                 
6
 Estimation of the conditional logit model depends on the ‘independence of irrelevant alternatives’ (IIA) assumption 
(Allison 2012). This means that the odds of choosing option j rather than option k are not affected by the presence or 
absence of other options. In our context, it is reasonable to assume IIA because “nominees are unlikely to be considered 
close substitutes for one another” (Pardoe and Simonton 2007, p. 381) and because of the large number of professionals 
that are included in each of the choice sets. 
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expected direction: professionals working in sequels were less likely to receive an accolade. 
Professionals whose team members received accolades in previous years (Team Reputation) 
were more likely to receive an accolade, a result consistent with findings from Rossman et al. 
(2010). The quality of each professional’s human capital (Artistic Reputation) is significant and 
in the postulated direction. Those professionals who previously worked in commercially 
successful movies (Commercial Success) were more likely to receive an accolade, while those 
who worked in more than one movie (Number of Movies) were less likely to receive an accolade. 
The only variable that was not statistically significant was Degree of Control, measured as the 
number of roles the professional performed.  
When all these variables are controlled, Periphery has a coefficient of -.927, which is 
somewhat smaller in magnitude than the bivariate coefficient reported above but still highly 
significant (p<0.0001). The corresponding odds ratio of .40 indicates that peripheral 
professionals had an odds of receiving an accolade that was 60 percent lower than the odds for 
core professionals.  
Results in Model 2 for critics show many similarities with the peer results. Again, the sets 
of dummies for genre and movie rating are highly significant. Like peers, critics tend to prefer 
those with a strong team reputation and a strong personal reputation, although the coefficients 
are somewhat smaller for critics. They also tend to dislike sequels, but for critics the effect is 
much larger. Unlike peers, critics are not swayed by whether a professional previously worked in 
commercially successful movies.  Another exception is Number of Movies, which has a positive 
coefficient for critics and a negative coefficient for peers. The most important difference – and 
the one that confirms our second hypothesis – is that the coefficient for Periphery is positive and 
far from statistically significant. Moreover, the difference between the Periphery coefficient for 
critics and the coefficient for peers is highly significant (p<.001). Thus, in contrast to peers, we 
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find no evidence that critics’ decisions were influenced by whether a professional was in the core 
or the periphery.   
 
<< Insert Table 3 Here >> 
 
Unobserved Heterogeneity. Although the models in Table 3 control for several characteristics 
of both the professionals and the films in which they appeared, it is possible that unobserved 
heterogeneity could have biased either the coefficients or their standard errors. For many 
reasons, some professionals may simply be more attractive to both peers and critics, and the 
same is likely to be true for films. Due to computational limitations, we were unable to introduce 
unobserved heterogeneity directly into the discrete choice models. However, we explored the 
potential consequences of unobserved heterogeneity by switching to a closely related 
specification. Instead of stratifying by year, organization, and role, we simply entered these three 
variables into the logistic regression models as sets of dummy variables. That allowed us to use 
standard methods for introducing random effects into logistic regression (Allison 2012, Ch. 8). 
We then estimated one model with a random effect for individual professionals and another 
model with a random effect for films. We used PROC GLIMMIX in SAS to estimate the models 
by maximum likelihood. Because the two effects are not nested, it was not computationally 
feasible to enter both individual and film random effects in the same model. Formally the model 
is specified as 
ijij
ij
ij
x
p
p
 








1
log  
where pij is the probability that professional i receives an accolade for film j, xij is a vector of 
predictor variables describing professional i and film j, and  is a vector of coefficients. The 
random effect ij is assumed to be normally distributed with a mean of 0 and a variance 
2
, and is 
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statistically independent of xij.  For the model with a random effect for individuals, the j subscript 
is deleted so that  varies only across individuals.  For the model with a random effect for films, 
the i subscript on  is deleted. 
  Instead of estimating the models separately for peers and critics, we estimated combined 
models for both audiences. This was essential to allow the unobserved heterogeneity to be 
common to both critics and peers. To distinguish the two groups, the combined data set included 
a dummy variable Critic with a value of 1 for critics and 0 for peers. The models also included 
an interaction between Critic and Periphery to test whether the effect of Periphery varied 
between the two audiences. Also included were interactions between Critic and three other 
variables – Number of Movies, Sequel, and Commercial Success – to accommodate apparent 
differences in the effects of these variables in Table 3.  
 To ensure consistency with the discrete choice models of Table 3, Model 3 in Table 4 
shows the results from a logistic model without any random effects. Careful inspection of the 
main effects and interactions reveals that these results are all quite similar to those in Table 3. 
Most importantly, the effect of Periphery for peers (-.910) in Model 3 (the main effect of 
Periphery) is quite close to the coefficient in Model 1 (-.927). Both are highly significant. The 
effect of Periphery for critics in Model 3 is obtained by adding the main effect to the Critic  
Peer interaction:  -.910 + 1.094= .184 which is not statistically significant. This compares with 
.089 in Model 2, also not statistically significant.   
Model 4 of Table 4 introduces a random effect for individual professionals. There is 
strong evidence for unobserved heterogeneity at the level of professionals: the estimated random 
effects variance is 7.822 with a standard error of .601. Results for two of the control variables are 
markedly different in this model, compared to the Models in Table 3. Commercial Success had 
significant positive effects in Models 1 and 2 but is not significant in Model 4. Artistic 
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Reputation had highly significant positive effects in Models 1 and 2 but a highly significant 
negative effect in Model 3. Despite these differences, our results for the key variable Periphery 
are essentially similar to those for the discrete choice models. Periphery has a highly significant 
negative effect for peers (-1.423) but no detectable effect for critics. The coefficient for critics is 
obtained by adding the main effect and the interaction: -1.423 + 1.162= -.261, which is not 
significantly different from zero. The odds ratio for peers is .24, translating to a 76 percent 
reduction in the odds of an accolade for members of the periphery compared with members of 
the core. The interaction between Critic and Periphery is highly significant, implying that the 
effects of Periphery for critics and peers are significantly different.  
 Model 5 introduces a random effect for films. As in Model 4, there is strong evidence for 
unobserved heterogeneity, this time at the film level. In this model, results for the control 
variables are fairly consistent with those in the discrete choice models. But the Periphery results 
are somewhat different.  Here the magnitude of the Periphery effect for peers is much smaller  
(-.443) although still highly significant. For critics, the Periphery effect is  
-.443 + 1.151 = .708, a highly significant positive effect corresponding to an odds ratio of 2.03.  
This means that, holding other factors constant, the odds that a critic organization will award an 
accolade to a periphery member are double the odds for a core member. This is our first evidence 
that critics may actually favor members of the periphery rather than simply being indifferent to 
core membership. Again, the highly significant interaction term tells us that the Periphery 
coefficients for peers and critics are significantly different. 
<< Insert Table 4 Here >> 
 We also estimated fixed effects models analogous to the two random effects models. 
These models have the attraction of actually controlling for all unchanging characteristics of 
professionals or films. Results essentially corroborated those in Models 4 and 5. However, we 
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are not reporting the details because large fractions of the professionals or films had to be 
excluded due to the absence of variation on the dependent variable.      
 
Scope Conditions. We further probed the previous results by estimating additional models in 
order to establish the conditions under which the identified patterns are more or less likely to 
occur. Three scope conditions seem especially important. One possibility is that peers’ 
preference for core cultural producers is restricted to the realm of elite peers who may have 
stronger stake in conformity and reciprocity. Our analysis has so far pooled all peers’ awards 
irrespective of the actual standing of their respective membership, but one could argue that not 
all awards are decided by elite peers. Notably, while the Academy awards express the taste and 
preference of prominent representatives of the various cinematic professions, the guilds 
encompass a much broader membership with some individuals only marginally attached to any 
given profession. To explore such potential award-specific effect we estimated separate discrete-
choice models for Academy awards and guild awards. The coefficients of the Periphery variable 
are negative (-0.927 in the model for the Academy and -0.913 in the model for the guilds) and 
statically significant (p<0.01), suggesting that peers’ preference for core members holds 
irrespective of the awarding body. We also tested whether the coefficient of the Periphery 
variable in the Academy model is statistically different from that in the Guilds model but found 
no significant difference. Thus, our results suggest that elite and non-elite peer choices follow a 
very similar pattern. 
Another possible objection is that there may be substantial variation among critics in their 
openness to peripheral professionals, with prestigious critics paying significantly greater 
attention to established cultural producers (Janssen 1997). Because of the lack of compelling 
empirical grounds for accepting or rejecting value judgments, a critic may risk her reputation by 
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expressing a judgment that differs from those of her colleagues (Van Rees 1987). A critic’s 
reputation as expert is “inseparably related to the extent to which, over a period of time, his 
judgments have met with his colleagues' approval” (Van Rees 1989, p. 498). Because they have 
more to lose, established critics may be less inclined to support deviant offers advanced by 
peripheral players. For instance, in the field of literary criticism by Janssen (1997) indicates that 
more occasional and therefore less established reviewers are those that tend to make more 
deviant choices. 
To address this issue, we isolated the award choices of two organizations that stand in 
sharp contrast to each other with respect to their prestige and influence: The National Society 
Film Critics (NSFC) and The Boston Society of Film Critics (BSFC). The NSFC was founded in 
1966 as a high-brow association to counter the other middle-brow film circles and it consists of 
57 of the nation’s most prestigious critics.  Every year these critics confer the NSFC Awards in 
10 categories. Established in the early 1980s, the BSFC is one of the youngest professional 
associations of film critics, and its membership consists exclusively of Boston-based journalists, 
primarily free-lancers with multiple affiliations and much less visibility than their NSFC 
counterparts. Every year the BSFC confers awards in 16 categories. To the extent that 
established critics act more deferentially, we expect critics’ tendency to favor peripheral 
producers to be stronger within the NSFC than the BSFC. Accordingly, we estimated separate 
discrete choice models for NSFC and BSFC. The coefficient of the Periphery variable is positive 
(1.190) and non-significant in the model for the NSFC, but positive (1.473) and statistically 
significant (p<0.5) in the model for the BSFC. The difference between the two coefficients is 
statistically significant.  While consistent with our theory, these results add nuance to our second 
prediction suggesting that critics’ homology to peripheral offers may depend on critics’ prestige. 
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In the preceding analyses, our dependent variable was coded 1 if a professional received 
one award or nomination, otherwise 0. But the same professional could receive more than one 
award or nomination for her performance in a movie in a given year, especially if she performed 
multiple roles in that movie. Accordingly, Models 6 and 7 in Table 5 report results for logistic 
regressions in which the dependent variable is coded 1 if a professional received 2 or more 
awards or nominations from peers (Model 6) or critics (Model 7).
7
 The goal is to capture the 
degree of consecration accruing to any professional. As before, we find that organizations of 
peers are less likely to bestow 2 or more accolades to peripheral members, while organizations of 
critics do not seem to favor core over peripheral members.  
<< Insert Table 5 Here >> 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
A rich and vibrant tradition building on Bourdieu’s pioneering insights treats cultural producers 
as engaged in an ongoing struggle to secure notoriety, prestige and esteem from colleagues. In 
this struggle to define what counts as culturally legitimate, the social audiences that control 
access to symbolic and material resources play a crucial role. Cultural consecration can be 
viewed as the most definitive form of cultural legitimation. By conferring honors, awards and 
prizes, cultural consecration separates individuals and their achievements that are worthy of 
admiration and respect from those that are not. Consecration is important in virtually every field 
of cultural production. Although the process of consecration may be governed in part by 
objective criteria associated with merit, achievement and performance, the relationship between 
observable differences and the attainment of symbolic capital is not straightforward. 
                                                 
7
 We estimated a logit model because the professional receiving 2 or more awards or nominations could get them 
from more than one awarding organization—and this has no longer the structure of a discrete choice model.       
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Following Bourdieu, we sought to understand the consecration of cultural producers and 
their work as a joint result of socio-structural conditions at the individual level and judgments 
made by audiences about cultural producers and their offers. We framed cultural producers’ 
claims for recognition as an on-going tension between the core and the periphery of the social 
field: on the one hand, core actors have an interest in continuity, identity and reproduction; on 
the other, peripheral actors are more prone to depart from established norms and standards. 
Audiences are central to this oppositional struggle because they define, elaborate and, most 
importantly, bestow differential value on some producers and their claims while devaluing 
others.  
After characterizing the discourse of value that permeates the social practice of 
consecration within two of the principal audiences in the film industry—peers and critics—we 
examined how these audiences differ in the extent to which their consecration choices are 
affected by the socio-topographic location of the producers they evaluate. Consistent with our 
hypotheses, we found that professionals in the periphery have lower odds of receiving an 
accolade from peers than professionals in the core. But core professionals do not have higher 
odds of receiving an accolade from critics than those in the periphery. When we allowed for 
unobserved heterogeneity at film level, we found even stronger support for an asymmetry in 
audiences’ consecration choices: not only do critics fail to privilege core incumbents but they 
actually favor peripheral producers in their awards of accolades. These findings yield several 
implications for future research that we now elaborate. 
 
Contributions to Cultural Sociology 
Conditional on prior achievements and status, the location of cultural producers in the social 
structure of a field may affect the consecration of their work and thus shape their reputation for 
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talent and creativity. This result complements the vast research that has treated individual merit 
as the primary factor in the production of work worthy of esteem (Sternberg 1985; Gardner 
1993). In contrast to this prevailing approach, relatively little attention has been devoted to the 
ways in which consecration is shaped by processes of social validation that are enforced by 
external evaluators. Our findings are consistent with recent evidence (Allen and Parson 2006; 
Rossman et al. 2010) that consecration does not occur in a social void but is instead embedded in 
patterns of relationships and shaped by audiences that grant or deny distinction to competing 
candidates. Crucially, attaining such consecration is likely to hinge on whether peripheral players 
can appeal to a homologous social audience whose members share the same or similar 
dispositions and whose views, beliefs and tastes are attuned to their own. Lacking the authority 
of core players – as well as their privileged access to resources, relationships and other external 
markers of credibility – peripheral players face significant obstacles as they strive to establish 
legitimacy and attain consecration from established institutions. In any field of cultural 
production, the existence of a homologous audience represents a critical enabling condition for 
peripheral players to marshal credibility and increase their likelihood of success.  
 
Contribution to Sociology of Stratification 
In one of the most elaborate conceptualizations about the determinants of cultural legitimacy, 
Bourdieu (1984) situated taste at the center of a comprehensive theory of the relationship 
between social inequality and cultural practice, revealing the hidden social forces threaded 
through aesthetic judgment (see also, Shrum 1991). From the choice of books to the consumption 
of rock music, symbolic forms operate within a system of exchanges and domination central to 
the reproduction of the social structure. By focusing on the socio-structural conditions underlying 
the consecration process, our study contributes to the literature on the determinants of 
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stratification (Merton 1968) which has focused mainly on actors (e.g., individuals, organizations) 
vying for recognition rather than on the audiences responsible for conferring it (Zuckerman 
1999). Research on the social structure of markets, for instance, has predominantly focused on 
attributes of market actors and the effects of their social position on the opportunities available to 
them (Podolny 1994; Benjamin and Podolny 1999). By emphasizing “homology” as a critical 
meso-level mechanism in the stratification of recognition, our study opens the door for a research 
agenda that exposes how audience evaluations shape the allocation of rewards among actors 
occupying different positions in a field’s social structure (Merton 1968). 
 
Contributions to Sociology of Evaluation 
In any cultural field, whether in art or science, the assessment of a given offer reflects subjective 
evaluation by the field’s relevant audiences. If audiences are diverse, highly divergent evaluation 
criteria may co-exist. This variation allows for more cosmopolitan and liberal cognitive styles, 
thus raising the chance that work that departs from accepted norms will find a more receptive 
audience. Indeed, work that fails to garner attention and approval from one audience might still 
win the “intellectual attention space” (Collins 1998) of another homologous audience, whose 
motivations are different and whose evaluation criteria may be more attuned to the dispositions 
of particular subsets of cultural producers.  
Building on Bourdieu’s intuition on the role of homology variations across audiences in 
shaping the allocation of symbolic capital between core and periphery, we examined a case in 
which cultural producers face audiences with different degrees of homology vis-à-vis the 
producers they evaluate. Specifically, we considered the selective judgments of individual 
worthiness that are the expression of distinct aesthetic logics embedded in peer- and critic-based 
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audiences. Focusing on these audiences allowed us to consider more carefully the social 
mechanisms that underlie the allocation of symbolic capital to core and peripheral producers. 
Previous research has delved into the question of how cultural products become 
consecrated and integrated into the canon by primarily using case studies (for a recent 
comprehensive review, see Lamont 2012). While case studies may provide deeper insight into 
the underlying mechanisms of the phenomenon of interest, they cannot unveil more general 
patterns that might extend to other cases – whether within the same or across different contexts. 
Following prior research (e.g., Allen and Lincoln 2004), we adopted a large-sample research 
design to go beyond the “accumulation of finite case studies to capture general subprocesses at 
work” (Lamont 2012, p. 206)—thus identifying more precise social-structural conditions that 
might affect the likelihood of consecration.  
Several questions merit further attention. First, the assignment of awards in the film 
industry is single-blind, not double-blind; as our results show, professionals’ reputation and 
cumulative recognition affect how favorably their work is received (Clemens et al. 1995). While 
our models controlled for a variety of factors associated with producers’ reputation and status, 
exploring the extent to which the social structural ordering of consecration applies beyond 
single-blinded contexts would be a significant addition. Also, this paper focuses on 
contemporaneous consecration, i.e., the recognition awarded to cultural producers within a short 
time after they produced their work. Contemporaneous consecration does not typically impart the 
same level of cultural legitimacy as retrospective consecration (Allen and Lincoln 2004) which 
attests that producers and products survived the test of time (Becker 1982; Bourdieu 1993). Yet 
contemporaneous consecration certainly raises the reputation of cultural producers, thereby 
increasing their access to the resources they need to continue their work (e.g., Anand and Watson 
2004; Lincoln 2007). What is the relationship between contemporaneous and retrospective 
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consecration of cultural producers? Do the odds of being retrospectively consecrated differ if 
contemporaneous consecration originates from critics as opposed to peers? These are but some 
of the many questions that future research could explore in greater depth.    
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Table 1 – List of Awarding Organizations (Audiences) 
 
 
Peer Audiences  
 
 
Critic Audiences  
 
 Academy of Motion Picture Arts & 
Sciences (Oscar) 
 
 Guilds 
 Directors Guild of America 
 Writers Guild of America 
 Screen Actors Guild 
 Art Directors Guild 
 American Society of 
Cinematographers 
 American Cinema Editors 
 
 
 New York Film Critics Circle 
 National Society of Film Critics 
 Los Angeles Film Critics 
Association 
 Boston Society of Film Critics 
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 Table 2 – Hollywood Studios and their Distribution Divisions* 
 
Studio Distribution division 
Sony American International Pictures 
Columbia 
Screen gems 
Sony Classics 
Sony Repertory 
TriStar 
Universal Focus Features 
Good Machine 
Gramercy 
October 
October Classics 
Polygram 
Rogue Pictures 
USA Films 
20th Century Fox Fox Intl Classics 
Fox Searchlight 
MGM (purchased by Sony in 2005) Orion Classics 
Orion Pictures 
United Artists 
Samuel Goldwyn 
Warner Bros. Castle Rock 
Fine Line 
New Line 
Warner Independent 
Paramount Paramount Classics (now Paramount 
Vantage) 
Republic 
Disney Buena Vista 
Caravan Pictures 
Dimension 
Hollywood Pictures 
Miramax 
Touchstone Pictures 
Dreamworks (purchased by Viacom in 2006)   
 
* The studios purchased distribution divisions at different times. Many of these divisions changed ownership during 
the study period (for instance: Focus Features is the art house films division of Universal Studios and originated 
from the 2002 divisional merger of USA Films, Universal Focus and Good Machine; October was purchased by 
Universal in 1997; Screen Gems became a specialty film-producing arm of the Sony group in 1999; Samuel 
Goldwyn was purchased by MGM in 1997; Castle Rock and New Line were purchased by Warner in 1996, etc.). In 
attributing film releases to major studios we accounted for the timing of all such transactions. 
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Table 3 – Discrete Choice Models 
 
 
Variables 
 
Model 1 
Peers 
Model 2 
Critics 
 
Movie Genre (dummies) included included 
  
 
 
Movie Rating (dummies) included included 
  
 
 
Movie Sequel (dummy) -1.010** -2.025** 
  (0.191) (0.715) 
Team Reputation 0.234** 0.139** 
  (0.018) (0.034) 
Degree of Control 0.112 -0.022 
  (0.078) (0.119) 
Commercial Success 0.224** 0.052 
  (0.026) (0.063) 
Artistic Reputation 0.573** 0.274** 
  (0.053) (0.092) 
Number of Movies (dummy) -0.102* 0.244** 
  (0.046) (0.077) 
Periphery -0.927** 0.089 
  (0.111) (0.247) 
Stratifying Variables: 
 
 
Awarding Organization  included included 
Year included included 
Individual Role included included 
  
 
 
  
 
 
ChiSq vs null 1535.18** 491.96** 
Degree of Freedom 27 27 
Number of Strata 163 230 
Number of Accolades 1128 323 
Number of Observations 
 
47905 
 
80677 
 
 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 – Two-tailed tests for all variables (standard errors in parentheses) 
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Table 4 – Logistic Regression Models with Random Effects (RE) 
 
 
Variables 
Model 3 
No RE 
Model 4 
RE for  
Professionals 
Model 5 
RE for 
Films 
 
Movie Genre (dummies) 
 
Included** Included** Included** 
    
Movie Rating (dummies) Included** Included** Included** 
    
Organization (dummies) Included** Included** Included** 
    
Year (dummies) Included** Included** Included* 
    
Individual Role (dummies) Included Included* Included 
    
Movie Sequel (dummy) -0.869** -0.894** -1.027** 
 (0.183) (0.228) (0.369) 
Team Reputation 0.212** 0.177** 0.553** 
 (0.015) (0.023) (0.063) 
Degree of Control 0.061 0.212 0.008 
 (0.064) (0.109) (0.079) 
Commercial Success 0.234** 0.052 0.251** 
 (0.024) (0.044) (0.032) 
Artistic Reputation 0.476** -1.343** 0.502** 
 (0.043) (0.098) (0.057) 
Number of Movies (dummy) -0.090* -0.168** 0.002 
 (0.043) (0.061) (0.050) 
Periphery -0.910** -1.423** -.443** 
 (0.107) (0.157) (0.151) 
Critic × Periphery 1.094** 1.162** 1.151** 
 (0.262) (0.290) (0.279) 
Critic × Number of Movies 0.295** 0.354** 0.338** 
 (0.067) (0.080) (0.074) 
Critic × Sequel -1.397 -0.992 -1.353 
 (0.732) (0.746) (0.770) 
Critic × Commercial Success -0.244** -0.141** -0.265** 
 (0.060) (0.068) (0.069) 
Random Effect Variance  7.822** 5.472** 
  (0.601) (0.504) 
Number of Accolades 1451 1451 1451 
Number of Observations 128582 128582 128582 
 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 – Two-tailed tests for all variables (standard errors in parentheses) 
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Table 5 – Scope Conditions 
 
  Model 6 Model 7 
Variables 
 
Logit 
(Peers) 
 
Logit 
(Critics) 
 
Movie Genre (dummies) 
 
Included** 
 
Included** 
 
Movie Rating (dummies) 
 
Included** 
 
Included** 
 
Movie Sequel (dummy) 
 
-1.306** 
 
-1.148 
 
Team Reputation 
(0.426) 
0.242** 
(0.738) 
0.166** 
 
Degree of Control 
(0.038) 
1.383** 
(0.063) 
0.400 
 
Commercial Success 
(0.232) 
0.263** 
(0.282) 
-0.192 
 
Artistic Reputation 
(0.057) 
0.567** 
(0.183) 
0.285 
 
Number of Movies (dummy) 
(0.094) 
-1.106** 
(0.189) 
0192 
Periphery 
 
 
 
 
(0.170) 
-1.109** 
(0.231) 
 
 
 
(0.174) 
0.322 
(0.553) 
 
 
 
Fixed Effects:   
Year included included 
Individual Role 
 
included included 
   
ChiSq vs null 539.53** 142.68** 
Number of Observations 21446 16959 
   
 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 – Two-tailed tests for all variable (standard errors in parentheses) 
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APPENDIX 
The Social Network Structure of the Field 
 
To analyze the social structure of the industry, we reconstructed the bipartite affiliation 
network between professionals and movies. The bipartite network is a triple G = (┬,
 
┴, 
E) where ┬ (movies) and ┴ (professionals) are two disjoint sets of nodes – i.e., the top 
and bottom nodes, respectively – and E  ┬ × ┴ is the set of links of the network. This 
differs from classical (unipartite) networks in that links exist only between top nodes and 
bottom nodes. Examples that have been studied in the past include networks of 
individuals joined together by common participation in social events (Davis, Gardner and 
Gardner 1941), CEOs of companies joined by common membership of social clubs 
(Galaskiewicz and Marsden 1978), collaborations among Broadway artists (Uzzi and 
Spiro 2005), and co-authorships (Newman 2001). For instance, in the case of co-
authoring ┬ would be the set of papers and ┴ the set of authors, each author being linked 
to the papers s/he (co-)authored. Since group membership can often be established from 
membership lists or other sources, studies of these networks do not have to rely on 
interviews or questionnaires, thereby allowing one to construct much larger and more 
accurate networks than in traditional social network studies (Newman, Wattz and 
Strogatz 2002).  
Given a bipartite network G = (┬,
 
┴, E), one can easily obtain its unipartite 
version defined as GI = (┴, E
I) where {u, v} is in EI if u and v are both connected to the 
same (top) node in G.  As illustrated in Figure 1, starting from the bipartite individual-by-
movie network one can then recover the unipartite version. In this unipartite version of 
the network, each top node (movie) induces a complete sub-network among the bottom 
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nodes (individuals) to which it is connected. Links form between individuals when they 
work on multiple movies. 
<< Insert Figure 1 >> 
In defining a tie, we had to make an assumption about the duration of the 
relationship between professionals. With no control for relationship decay, professionals’ 
network connectedness would be highly inflated due to the likely inclusion of ties to 
inactive artists. Following a common practice in network studies, we made the adjacency 
matrixes time-limited by using a three-year moving window to control for the duration of 
each tie. In essence, each year we added nodes and ties resulting from new movies, and 
deleted nodes and their ties that had been inactive for 3 years (see also Uzzi and Spiro 
2005). We started with the professionals who worked in 1995 and used the earlier three-
year data to construct the accumulative relational profiles (i.e., the period 1992-1994 can 
be viewed as the time needed to establish the network structure that professionals brought 
to the period 1995 onwards). We used the resulting ten time-varying matrices to compute 
all individual level network measures. Using alternative windows of two, four and five 
years produced no appreciable differences in our results. 
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Figure 1 
A bipartite network and its unipartite version 
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